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Measuring state behavior in maritime and territorial disputes:  
China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, 1970-2015 
 
Why has the People’s Republic of China (PRC) courted international opprobrium, alarmed its 
neighbors, and risked military conflict in pursuit of its claims covering vast areas of the South 
China Sea? Despite bearing heavily on the security of the world’s most economically vibrant 
region in the 21st century, the question has remained unresolved. Many observers find China’s 
regional expansion unsurprising in light of its growing material power, but others identify the 
maritime policy change with unfavorable regional developments for Beijing.1 Area specialists 
focusing on domestic political factors are similarly divided, with some pointing to bottom-up 
challenges to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy from rising popular nationalism, 
and others arguing elite vested interests or overzealous front-line agencies lie behind the 
maritime expansion.2 Proponents of individual-level explanations diverge on which Chinese 
leader is supposed to be responsible for the push through the maritime periphery — a weak 
Hu Jintao unable to restrain confrontational conduct, or a strong, hawkish Xi Jinping driving it.3  
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This article argues the key to understanding the dynamics of the South China Sea conflict lies 
in longer-term patterns of continuity and change in state behavior. In territorial and maritime 
disputes, lines of action introduced at one point in time have cumulative effects, creating the 
conditions for further changes in behavior in the future, and crucial decisions can take years 
and even decades to manifest. I show that the most recent turning point in China’s policy 
occurred in 2007, several years earlier than most analyses have recognized, and trace this shift 
to decisions taken in the late 1990s towards strategic objectives that emerged in the 1970s. The 
article reveals these patterns by constructing a new typology of state behaviors in maritime 
and territorial disputes, applying it to a unique time series dataset of PRC behavior in the South 
China Sea from 1970 to 2015, and analyzing the key turning points. 
Assessing competing explanations for the PRC’s South China Sea behavior has proved 
challenging due to a lack of clarity on exactly what has changed in, and when. Relatively few 
analyses provide precise definitions or measurements of the behavioral changes they seek to 
explain. Many have focused on coercion, but this excludes key aspects of China’s maritime 
expansion, such as its large-scale island-building program in the Spratly Islands, or the 
increasing on-water presence of ostensibly unarmed surveillance ships.4 Such behaviors are 
captured by the concept of gray-zone conflict, defined by “attempts to achieve one’s security 
objectives without resort to direct and sizable use of force.” But China’s maritime dispute policy 
has rarely left the gray zone — a 1988 naval battle with Vietnam being its most recent military 
clash — which limits the concept’s utility in identifying variation over time.5  
The most common label attached to China’s current maritime behavior is “assertive,” but the 
meaning of this term has remained imprecise. 6  Attempts to deploy it analytically have 
produced a mushrooming list of modifiers: from “passive assertiveness,” “non-confrontational 
assertiveness” and “reactive assertiveness,” to “creeping assertiveness,” “militant 
assertiveness” and “aggressive assertiveness.” Given this array of descriptive characterizations 
of the changes in China’s behavior, it is not surprising that there is little agreement on when the 
key policy change occurred, with estimates ranging from the early 2000s through to Xi Jinping’s 
ascension in late 2012 and beyond. Answering these what and when questions is a crucial step 
towards understanding the why. 
This article begins by defining and disaggregating the concept of assertiveness into a typology 
suitable for measuring quantitative and qualitative change in state behavior over time. Works 
investigating territorial disputes as a cause of militarized escalation and war have focused on 
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three generic state behaviors, summarized by Fravel as compromise, delay, and use of force.7 
But within this rubric, the PRC has pursued a near-continuous delaying strategy in the South 
China Sea. The framework developed here captures the ways states advance their positions in 
such disputes without resorting to either force or compromise. It also takes account of 
particular features of maritime spaces as objects of dispute — a domain in which the dangers 
of conflict over maritime disputes are widely believed have increased in recent decades, 
especially in East Asia.8  
The empirics presented here address key shortcomings in the information sources upon which 
most existing analyses of the South China Sea rely. Few studies have attempted to measure 
China’s maritime behavior using events data or control for the major present-centric bias in the 
supply of information on such events. 9 In 1988, when the PRC attacked Vietnam in the Spratly 
Islands and seized six reefs, the confrontation raised little more than a blip on the international 
media agenda. Today, the South China Sea dispute is regarded as one of the world’s conflict hot 
spots, and vast volumes of information circulate on daily developments there. China’s increased 
economic and military power has drawn increased attention to its actions from foreign 
governments and media, while the internet has dramatically increased the volume information 
about current events more generally. Beijing’s own growing openness about its activities, 
meanwhile, has further increased the information supply about recent events.  
To address this challenge, I employ an original time series of PRC actions in the South China Sea 
dispute from 1970 to 2015 that draws on sources not subject to the present-centric bias in the 
open-source English-language information supply. These include internal-circulation PRC 
chronologies of events in the South China Sea, advisory reports from Chinese government 
specialists, scientific reports, and yearbooks of PRC maritime agencies. Analysis of the data 
shows both a long-term trend of increasing PRC assertiveness since the 1970s, as well as four 
                                                        
7 M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 5. The extensive literature on territorial disputes has 
demonstrated their importance as a cause of interstate conflict and explored the conditions for military 
escalation and peaceful resolution, but leaves aside patterns of state behavior below these thresholds. A partial 
exception is Huth’s study of 129 territorial disputes between 1950 and 1990, which distinguishes political-
diplomatic escalation from military escalation. Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and 
International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), p.105. The leading quantitative resource 
on maritime disputes is the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) dataset, which includes claim initiation, militarized 
escalation and peaceful settlement attempts for maritime disputes in Europe and the Western Hemisphere 
between 1900 and 2001. However, like the MID data it builds upon, it does not distinguish state actions below 
the threshold of threat or use of force. Paul R. Hensel, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Thomas E. Sowers and Clayton L. 
Thyne, “Bones of Contention: Comparing Territorial, Maritime and River Issues,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Vol. 52, No. 1 (2008), pp. 117-143. 
8 Lee Hsien Loong, “Scenarios For Asia in the Next 20 Years,” speech at Nikkei Conference, Tokyo, May 22-23, 
2014, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/media-release/scenarios-asia-next-20-years; Michael D. Swaine et al., Conflict 
and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Net Assessment (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2015); David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos and Cristina L. Garafola, War With China: 
Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), p. 8; ICG, Stirring Up the South China 
Sea (I); ICG, Dangerous Waters.  
9 The most systematic longitudinal study on PRC behavior in the South China Sea to date is Zhang’s time series of 
PRC coercive acts since 1990. However, being assembled to test a theory of the conditions under which the PRC 
engages in compellence, the time series does not measure the PRC’s behavior per se, but rather Beijing’s 
responses to two specific kinds of unilateral administrative behavior by Southeast Asian claimants. Zhang, 
“Cautious bully.” 
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breakpoints — in 1973, 1987, 1992 and 2007 — marked by significant increases in activity and 
the introduction of new methods, constituting important changes in China’s policy there.10 The 
data pinpoint two key differences between China’s post-2007 policy and its earlier surges in 
the South China Sea: the protracted duration of its administrative buildup, and the introduction 
of regular coercive actions. 
These empirical findings enable a new evaluation of a range of hypothesized explanations for 
Beijing’s policy in the South China Sea, helping advance theoretical debate about a key case of 
foreign policy change in the twenty-first century.11  Policy decisions may take years to manifest 
in observable behavior, so advancing positive claims about the causes of state behavior 
requires analysis of documentary evidence and other qualitative sources. The latter part of the 
article therefore turns to focused analyses of the four turning points in the PRC’s conduct, 
drawing on Chinese party-state sources. The surges in PRC assertiveness in 1973, 1987 and 
1992 were, to a significant degree, opportunistic responses to favorable geopolitical 
circumstances. In contrast, the processes that produced the 2007 turning point were set in 
motion nearly 10 years earlier, when Beijing decided to develop new domestic legal-
administrative structures, organizational systems and maritime law enforcement capabilities 
designed to extend wide-ranging state administrative authority over the maritime spaces 
around China’s periphery. Tracing these four turning points shows how this goal, and the 
assertive state behaviors that seek to realize it, emerged from several decades of interplay 
between the PRC party-state and the emerging international Law of the Sea regime. 
The remainder of the article proceeds in four steps. The first section builds a conceptual 
framework to render assertiveness a tractable variable with which to measure state behavior in 
maritime and territorial disputes, and disaggregates a four-way typology of assertive actions. 
The second section operationalizes this framework, applying it to an original set of events data 
on China’s actions in the South China Sea from 1970 to 2015. Guided by the quantitative data, 
the third section provides focused qualitative examinations of the four identifiable breakpoints, 
engaging existing works on the PRC’s past and present policies and drawing new insights from 
Chinese party-state sources. The conclusion considers some broader implications of these 
findings for analysts and policymakers. 
 
Assertiveness as a variable 
The word “assertiveness” has arguably defined the English-language discourse on the PRC’s 
recent policies on its maritime periphery, and perhaps its foreign policy in general.12 Yet the 
term has so far not formed part of any established theory of state behavior in international 
relations. Johnston inferred from common usage that it refers to “diplomacy that explicitly 
threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than before” — that is, more 
                                                        
10 Charles Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy,” International 
Studies Quarterly Vol. 34, No. 1 (1990), pp. 3-21.  
11 Hermann, “Changing course”; Jakob Gustavsson, “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” Cooperation 
and Conflict, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1999), pp. 73-95; David A. Welch, Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
12 Johnston, “How New and How Assertive?”; Bjorn Jerden, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and 
How So Many Bought Into It,” Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2014), pp. 47-88. 
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coercive.13 But in relation to China’s maritime disputes at least, the term has been associated 
with various classes of behavior, such as legal-administrative acts and infrastructural projects 
like artificial island-building, that do not necessarily involve coercion.14  
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines assertiveness as “bold or confident statements and 
behavior.” This usefully covers the array of methods, both verbal and physical, and not 
necessarily directly confrontational, by which states pursue their interests in disputes like the 
South China Sea. Adapting this standard definition to the context of maritime and territorial 
disputes, assertiveness can be defined as statements and behaviors that strengthen the state’s 
position in the dispute.  
This definition serves three key purposes. First, it breaks assertiveness down into observable 
events — statements and behaviors — that can be identified without the need for strong 
subjective judgements about the state of mind of the actor. In the context of disputes 
constructed around specific geographies, the “bold or confident” quality of a state’s statements 
and behavior can instead be inferred from their impact on the relative positions of the parties 
in relation to the object of dispute, as discussed in further detail below. This renders 
assertiveness a tractable variable for measuring change in state behavior. 
Second, the definition captures the broad sweep of state actions over a contested possession. 
Unless a dispute is dormant or subject to a cooperative agreement that simultaneously 
strengthens both parties’ positions, such as joint resource development, merely maintaining a 
disputed claim involves some level of assertiveness. A state’s assertiveness can thus be 
understood as a continuous scale variable whose relative value is determined by the number 
of assertive acts introduced, maintained, or discontinued over a given time period.  
The third purpose is to link the concept of assertiveness with earlier conceptual work on 
territorial dispute behavior by placing the state’s position in the dispute at the center of the 
definition. A state’s position comprises three elements:  
(1) overall administrative presence in the disputed area;  
(2) ability to secure interests there using military force; and  
(3) ability to sustain the claim in international law. 
This three-point formulation builds on Fravel’s definition of a state’s bargaining position as “the 
amount of the disputed land that it occupies and its ability to project military power over the 
entire area under dispute,” but with two necessary modifications. One is to use overall 
administrative presence, rather than the amount of disputed land occupied, as the first 
component. The other is the inclusion of legal claim viability. 
Overall administrative presence refers to all state assets within the disputed area — from mobile 
units like vehicles, ships and aircraft, to fixed facilities like roads, buildings, airstrips, ports and 
sovereignty markers, as well as less visible manifestations of state presence such as cellular 
networks and scientific equipment. Unlike in land disputes, where lines of actual control keep 
each state’s official presence relatively distinct, disputed maritime spaces and uninhabited 
                                                        
13 Johnston, “How New and How Assertive?” pp. 9-10. 
14 Some of the modifiers often attached to assertiveness suggest coercive qualities (“militant,” “aggressive”), but 
others disassociate assertiveness from coercion (“passive,” “creeping”).  
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features are often subject to simultaneous or overlapping control. In such cases administrative 
presence, rather than occupation, is the main mode by which state authority is exercised over 
the disputed possession. Regular patrolling by government boats, for example, has consolidated 
China’s presence in the space around the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China 
Sea, and around features in the South China Sea. Thus overall administrative presence includes, 
but is not limited to, the amount of disputed land under occupation.  
Legal claim viability should also be regarded as a component of a state’s bargaining position in 
territorial and maritime disputes for two interlinked reasons.15 First, international law forms 
an important element of states officials’ own understanding of their bargaining positions. This 
is particularly so for maritime claims, which are governed by a codified international treaty 
with 159 state parties — the UNCLOS — but it is also evident in the increasing use of 
international legal processes in terrestrial disputes.16 The stronger a state considers its claim 
to be under international law, the greater its potential to resolve the dispute in its favor without 
facing the costs and unpredictability of using force. Conversely, when a state’s legal position is 
challenged, its potential for cheaply accessing favorable outcomes diminishes, compromising 
its overall position. This helps explain the sensitivity of states to potentially legally significant, 
but otherwise relatively innocuous, actions by adversaries.17  
Second, even where a state can project significant military force over a disputed area, the costs 
of doing so will depend significantly on international perceptions of its legality. The fact that 
even claimants with strong military advantages over their rivals have launched major historical 
and legal research efforts aimed at justifying their claims suggests that this is widely 
understood. Treating legal viability as a component of a state’s overall position in an 
international dispute does not mean accepting international law as a meaningful constraint on 
the actions of great powers, especially the use of military force. But developments that 
undermine a state’s ability to sustain its claims in international law increase the likely costs of 
any future use of military force.  
Defining assertiveness in maritime and territorial disputes as statements and behaviors that 
strengthen the state’s position will enable its operationalization as a study variable, but assertive 
conduct thus defined can vary widely in its implications for international stability. By design, 
the concept covers acts ranging from verbal statements all the way to the deployment of 
military force. Accounting for the qualitative differences between different types of assertive 
conduct requires distinctions to be drawn between different types of assertive actions.  
                                                        
15 Taking account of the legal factor does not entail assessment of the actual legal strength of one state’s claim 
relative to its rivals, just the potential international legal significance of state actions, and patterns of action, 
taken in disputed areas. 
16 Beth Simmons, “See You in ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of 
Territorial Disputes,” in Paul F. Diehl (ed.), A Road Map to War (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), p. 
225.   
17 When Sino-Japanese tensions erupted after an incident in the East China Sea in 2010, the PRC made clear that 
its escalatory countermeasures were not a response to the physical detention of the Chinese fishing boat captain, 
but rather to Japan’s decision to initiate domestic legal proceedings against him. See Andrew Chubb, Chinese 
Nationalism and the ‘Gray Zone': Case Analyses from China’s Maritime Disputes (forthcoming: U.S. Naval War 
College Press). See also M. Taylor Fravel, "Explaining China's Escalation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands," 
Global Summitry, Vol. 2, No.1 (2016), p. 31. 
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Four types of assertive actions 
Existing typologies of state behavior in territorial and maritime disputes have not yet 
recognized important variations below the use of force. The standard Militarized Interstate 
Disputes (MID) coding scheme, for example, distinguishes various “hostility levels” for 
incidents in which a state threatens or uses military force against another state, but excludes 
actions below this threshold of militarization. 18  Huth codes diplomatic and political 
confrontation separately from military escalation, but leaves non-confrontational assertive 
actions indistinguishable from “minimal or no diplomatic/political conflict.”19 Fravel’s three-
way typology of territorial dispute behavior similarly treats actions short of military escalation 
or seizure of territory as “delay.” 20 The concept of gray zone conflict, meanwhile, bundles 
together non-cooperative state conduct all the way up to the threshold of military force.21 Four 
types of assertive actions in maritime and territorial disputes are identifiable, based on their 
increasingly serious implications for the positions of rival claimants: (1) declarative, (2) 
demonstrative, (3) coercive, and (4) use of force.  
As summarized in Table 1, these four categories constitute an ordinal typology. This means that 
individual cases of behavioral change belong in the highest-level category for which they meet 
the criteria. 22  Thus, as explained below, patrolling a disputed area is classified as a 
demonstrative behavior, though it may also involve declarative proclamations of the state’s 
claim to the area. Likewise, direct interference with another state’s construction project or 
resource survey will belong unambiguously in the coercive category, even if it also entails 
declarative and demonstrative elements. Direct seizure of a particular disputed land or sea area 
will constitute a use of force, even though it usually also involves buildups of administrative 
presence (demonstrative), threats of punishment (coercive) and verbal claims (declarative). 
 
Types of assertiveness Existing concepts 
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
   
Use of force Use of force / escalation  
(Fravel 2008); brute force 
                                                        
18 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, 
Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," Conflict Management and Peace Science, No. 15 (1996), pp. 163-213.  
19 Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 103-106. 
20 Fravel, Strong Borders, p. 5. 
21 Green et al., Countering Coercion, p. 21; Peterson, “The Chinese Maritime Gray Zone,” p. 16; Michael Mazarr, 
Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding A Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College 
Press, 2015), p. 4. 
22 For a general discussion of ordinal classification schemes see Scott H. Beck, “Decomposition of Inequality by 
Class and by Occupation: A Research Note,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 141, 147-
149. Other examples include Hermann’s typology of foreign policy change, and the three-point scale of 
diplomatic and military conflict in territorial disputes in Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 105. 
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Application of military force or direct seizure and 
occupation of disputed possession. 
(Schelling 1966); 











   
Coercive 
Threat or imposition of punishment: may be verbal, 
diplomatic or administrative, economic punishment, 
warning shots, physical interference with foreign 









Unilateral administration of disputed possession: 
patrols, surveys, resource development, construction of 
infrastructure, state-sanctioned tourism or activism, 
domestic judicial proceedings, and cooperative 
agreements with third parties. 
Gray zone conflict (Green 
et al. 2017; Peterson 
2019); delay (Fravel 




Verbal assertions via non-coercive statements, 
diplomatic notes, domestic legislation and 
administrative measures, international legal cases. 
Table 1: Four-way typology of assertiveness in maritime and territorial disputes, mapped onto existing concepts. 
 
(1) Declarative actions are official claims over the disputed area that make no discernable threat 
to impose punishment on rival states. Such statements fit the broad definition of assertiveness 
outlined above because they affect the position of competing claimants, both by demonstrating 
non-recognition of those claims, and because they are often considered as evidence in 
international legal proceedings. 23  Declarative actions include remarks by state officials, 
domestic laws and regulations, diplomatic declarations, submissions to international 
authorities, and changes in domestic administrative arrangements governing the disputed area. 
Their significance is evident in the fact that they frequently prompt official protests from other 
states — and they also typically stay in effect in perpetuity unless actively renounced. But 
because they involve neither physical actions in the disputed area nor threats of punishment, 
declarative actions are a qualitative step further removed from conflict than the 
higher categories of assertive behavior discussed below. 
(2) Demonstrative moves are unilateral administrative behaviors — actions that manifest a 
state’s presence or jurisdiction in the disputed area, but without directly confronting 
                                                        
23 See Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No. 
2013-19 (2016), available at: https://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7 
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adversaries.24 In many disputed areas, particularly at sea, states may advance their position 
without engaging adversaries at all.25 Typical demonstrative moves include physical acts like 
air and sea patrols, scientific surveys, unilateral resource exploitation, construction works, as 
well as state-sponsored civilian actions like tourism, activism and resource exploitation. 
Certain kinds of non-physical moves can also be demonstrative, such as signing agreements 
with third parties over resource development, or domestic administrative or judicial 
proceedings over the disputed area. For example, Japan launched legal proceedings against a 
PRC fishing boat captain who rammed a Japanese Coast Guard ship in the disputed territorial 
seas around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in 2010, and Tokyo nationalized three of the disputed 
islands in 2012. Because they demonstrate effective administration of the claimed area, or 
external recognition of the claim, this class of actions compromise the position of other states 
in the dispute more than declarative actions do. Indeed, they can constitute stepping stones to 
acquisition by fait accompli.26 However, demonstrative acts do not involve discernible threats 
or punishment of other parties. These belong to the next category, coercion. 
(3) Coercive behaviors are those involving the threat or use of punishment against an 
adversary.27 Some actions self-evidently satisfy this definition, such as physical interference 
with foreign activities in a disputed area, or the firing of warning shots. But coercive state 
behaviors can also take a variety of other forms, as Zhang has highlighted, including formal and 
informal economic sanctions via the disruption of trade, through to threatening public 
statements, diplomacy and administrative moves.28 For example, promulgating territorial sea 
baselines that upgrade disputed waters to sovereign territorial seas under domestic law, or the 
establishment of Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) in contested areas, can communicate 
threats to other state and non-state actors entering such areas. Coercive actions pose more 
serious risks to stability than the two types of assertive actions discussed above because they 
present a relatively narrow set of choices to other parties: alter their behavior, continue and 
risk incurring punishment. The only qualitatively more escalatory kind of move is a military 
                                                        
24 The Merriam-Webster definition is (1a) “demonstrating as real or true,” (1b) “characterized or established by 
demonstration.” Actions conveying a clear threat or warning to others, however, are not demonstrative but 
coercive. 
25 In disputes that take place in wide geographical expanses, interactions between adversaries may be minimal, 
enabling states to “take what they want” incrementally, without the need for coercion. Schelling referred to this 
as “salami tactics.”  Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966 [2004]), pp. 
66-69.  
26 Dan Altman, “By Fait Accompli, Not Coercion: How States Wrest Territory from Their Adversaries,” 
International Studies Quarterly, No. 61 (2017), pp. 881-891. 
27 This follows the usage established by Schelling, which includes both deterrent and compellent varieties of 
coercion. Recent scholarly usage has often equated coercion with compellence, in line with George’s concept of 
“coercive diplomacy,” defined as “a response to an encroachment already undertaken” and thus distinct from 
deterrence. As Art and Greenhill point out, such a concept could be more accurately labelled compellent 
diplomacy. For the present purposes, adopting the broader definition allows us to sidestep questions of whether 
the target had been engaging in encroachment or aggression. Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 69; Alexander L. 
George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace, 1991), p. 4; Robert A. Art and Kelly Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” in Kelly 
Greenhill and Peter Krause eds., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press), p. 13n18. 
28 Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” pp. 120-122. 
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attack or unambiguous forceful change in the status quo of a disputed possession, as discussed 
below. 
(4) Use of force. The most escalatory type of action in a maritime or territorial dispute is the 
application of military violence or direct seizure of the disputed possession. This category maps 
directly onto the use of force category in Fravel’s existing typology.29 Such actions are a sub-set 
of what Schelling described as “brute force”: actions that rely on the actor’s own strength to 
achieve goals directly, rather than by influencing adversary conduct as in coercion.30 There are 
three key reasons why such actions are qualitatively more escalatory than coercive ones. First, 
in-kind responses from the adversary, or action to restore the status quo ante, will entail 
physical confrontation. Second, actions that conspicuously change the status quo threaten the 
basic viability of the adversary’s bargaining position, generating incentives for preventive 
escalation. 31  Third, actions of an unambiguously forceful character are likely to place the 
adversary’s leadership under political pressure by engaging their domestic competence and 
international reputation. Notably, the use of force does not necessarily involve military units, 
since civilian actors can be deployed to seize disputed possessions, as in the case of the PRC’s 
occupation of Mischief Reef in 1994. 
Having distinguished these four qualitatively different types of assertive state behavior in 
maritime disputes, it is now possible to identify changes in the quantity and quality of 
assertiveness in a state’s behavior across time. Assertive behavior intensifies where an 
observed action is either: a.) a new method of advancing the claim, unseen in previous time 
periods; b.) more frequent than in previous time periods, for example an increase in patrol 
activity or resource exploration and exploitation; or c.) applied over a broader geographic area 
than in previous time periods. The intensification of assertiveness is key to identifying change 
in states’ overall dispute behavior; the 132 cases of behavioral change analyzed in the next 
section each constitute an intensification of the PRC’s assertiveness compared with the 
previous calendar year. However, once a given action is identified as a case of assertive 
behavioral change, it is important to consider whether, in subsequent time periods, it 
intensified further, continued or diminished.32 
With a tractable definition of assertiveness in territorial and maritime disputes, and a typology 
of qualitatively distinct assertive state actions, it is possible to more rigorously investigate the 
continuities and changes in state conduct in disputes such as the South China Sea. The next 
section applies this framework to a unique time series of 132 cases of year-on-year change in 
the PRC’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea between 1970 and 2015. This provides the 
first systematic measurement of the quantitative and qualitative variation in China’s maritime 
dispute behavior across that time period.  
                                                        
29 Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation,” p. 50. 
30 Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 2-5. See also Sechser’s description of compulsion, the forcible imposition of 
the state’s objectives. Todd Sechser, “Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (2011), pp. 377-401, 385. 
31 Fravel, Strong Borders; Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation.” From the perspective of prospect theory, a rapid 
and conspicuous change in the status quo is likely to place the adversary in the risk-acceptant “domain of losses.” 
32 See Appendix for a discussion of inferences regarding the duration and diminishment of assertive behaviors. 
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PRC assertiveness by the numbers 
A key challenge in assessing the changes in China’s behavior in the South China Sea is the 
present-centric bias in the information supply. For a host of reasons — from heightened 
scrutiny of China’s behavior as its influence has grown, to the arrival of the Internet, and the 
party-state’s increasing willingness to publicize its activities — alterations in PRC behavior are 
much more likely to have been observed in English-language sources in recent years than 
further back in the past. To mitigate this bias, the data set analyzed below draws on historical 
PRC sources, mainly reference materials intended to inform Beijing’s policymakers of events in 
the maritime domain and report on the implementation of policies. These include internal-
circulation PRC chronologies on major events in the South China Sea covering the period up to 
1996,33 advisory reports on the situation in the South China Sea from 2002 to 2009,34 and 
yearbooks of PRC government agencies covering the state’s civilian maritime activities from 
the 1970s through to the present.35 These materials help identify previously unrecognized past 
alterations in PRC behavior, and confirm details of other historical cases.36  
The particular biases in such sources also need to be born in mind. Despite being reference 
materials, these sources typically adopt an unquestioningly pro-PRC perspective on the events 
they describe. Like the PRC’s public-facing comments on the South China Sea, they 
overwhelmingly characterize China as the victim of unprovoked encroachments at the hands 
of its adversaries. Indeed, many of the chronologies focus primarily on other claimants’ 
activities in the South China Sea. However, this should increase confidence in the veracity of 
those cases of assertive PRC behavior that do appear. If assertive PRC conduct is referred to in 
such sources, this is also a strong indication that it was intentional, rather than an accident or 
the result of unauthorized lower-level actions. Overall, drawing information from these sources 
should increase the closeness of the relationship between the time series data and the 
underlying PRC behavior it seeks to represent. 
 
Increasing assertiveness as a constant 
                                                        
33 State Oceanic Administration (SOA), “Dashiji (Chronicle of major events).” State Oceanic Administration. 
Yearly for period 1963-2003, available at: https://www.soa.gov.cn/memo/index.html via Archive.org; Zhang 
Liangfu, Nansha Qundao Dashiji (Chronicle of Major Events in the Spratly Islands), (Beijing: Zhongguo Kexue Yuan, 
1996). 
34 Nanhai Xingshi Pinggu Baogao (Evaluative Report on Developments in the South China Sea), (Haikou: Zhongguo 
Nanhai Yanjiuyuan, 2002-2009). 
35 Fisheries Administration, Zhongguo Yuye Nianjian (China Fisheries Yearbook), (Beijing: Nongye Chubanshe 
[Agriculture Press]); SOA, Zhongguo Haiyang Nianjian (China Ocean Yearbook), (Beijing: Haiyang Chubanshe). 
Volumes published between 1987 and 2014.  
36 Candidate cases of year-on-year change in PRC assertive behavior entered the dataset through a two-stage 
assessment process, before being coded according to the typology outlined above. Further discussion of data 
collection, methodology and coding checks are provided in the Appendix. A full list of sources, along with case 
descriptions, is included in the data file. 
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The first key point that emerges from the time series is that increasing PRC assertiveness itself 
is not a new development in the South China Sea. As Figure 1 shows, the PRC has advanced its 
position in the disputes there in some form almost every year since 1970. There have been only 
four years since 1970 when the PRC’s assertiveness did not intensify in some way — and the 
most recent was in 1990.  
Second, within the overall picture of increasing assertiveness in China’s policy, four periods of 
rapid acceleration are apparent: 1973-1975, 1987-1989, 1992-1995, and 2007 onwards. 
Outside these four periods, the average number of cases observed is around 1.8 per year, a 
figure that can be understood as representing the baseline growth rate of the PRC’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. In contrast, during these four periods the average number 
of intensified assertive behaviors observed rose to between 3.0 and 5.1 per year. The PRC’s 
most recent surge in assertiveness is therefore not a new development per se. Rather, it 
represents the PRC’s fourth major push in the South China Sea since 1970. 
 
 
Figure 1: Intensifications of PRC assertiveness in South China Sea by type, 1970-2015. 
 
Breakpoint 2007  
The most recent turning point in the PRC’s behavior occurred in 2007. Figure 1 illustrates the 
major qualitative change in the type of actions by which China has advanced its position since 
that time. The cluster of red-colored bars on the right-hand side of the chart indicate the 
introduction of much more frequent coercive actions — those that involve the threat or use of 
punishment — since 2007. This indicates that China’s policy underwent what Hermann termed 
a “program shift,” wherein new methods are deployed in pursuit of the state’s foreign policy 
goals, as well as increased intensity of existing practices. 37  The finding is consistent with 
Zhang’s data on the PRC’s coercive responses to Southeast Asian countries’ energy and 
construction activities, but contrasts with most English-language accounts of the PRC’s South 
China Sea policy, which typically date the assertive shift to 2009, 2012 or even later.  
                                                        
37 Hermann, “Changing course.” 
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Thirteen cases of new or intensified PRC coercive behaviors were identified between 1970 and 
2006 — an average of 0.3 cases per year. By contrast, 19 such cases have been observed in the 
nine years since 2007. This represents an average of 2.1 cases per year, a sevenfold increase in 
observations of the most dangerous type of assertive activity short of the use of force. In fact, 
when coercive forms of assertive activity are excluded from the analysis, the difference 
between the pre- and post-2007 periods no longer meets conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 38  New coercive actions, in other words, account for the most of the overall 
quantitative change in China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea since 2007.  
No subsequent year has established a new pattern of behavior different from the one that began 
in 2007. The strongest alternative candidate is 2012, when nine cases were observed, including 
the seizure of Scarborough Shoal, making it the PRC’s most assertive year since 1970. However, 
this did not constitute a turning point. Rather than continuing to accelerate after 2012, the 
average yearly number of intensified assertive actions fell back to 5.3 per year in 2013-2015, 
only marginally higher than the 5.1 observed on average each year since 2007. Thus, 2012 is 
better seen as an extreme case within a broader pattern established five years earlier. 
Finally, dating the PRC’s assertive shift to 2012 would also obscure a crucial feature of the 
change in China’s behavior that distinguishes its current policy from earlier periods. If, as the 
data presented here suggest, the fourth surge in assertive PRC maritime behavior began in 
2007, then it is also by far the most protracted. The three previous surges lasted only two or 
three years. In contrast, the intensification of PRC activity that began in 2007 has continued for 
a decade and beyond.  
 
Layers of assertiveness 
What have these patterns added up to across the period since 1970? Figure 2 addresses this 
question by adding into the picture what is known, or can reasonably be inferred, about the 
duration of each identified case of intensified assertive conduct. In more than one-third of cases, 
the intensification of China’s assertiveness marked a “new normal” that has continued through 
to the present. This stands to reason, given that many assertive actions are by nature ongoing 
and continuous, such as domestic legal and administrative moves and the construction of 
facilities in disputed areas, which remain in place until abolished or abandoned. Figure 2 
illustrates how each of the surges in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s established a new and higher 
overall baseline level of PRC assertiveness in the dispute. But the cumulative layering of 
assertive behaviors also reflects deeper dynamics of state policymaking in maritime and 
territorial disputes.  
Assertive actions in a disputed area at one point in time often lay the groundwork for 
subsequent intensifications of activity. Garver has noted how China’s construction activities in 
the South China Sea in the 1970s and 1980s created the “physical base” for the expansion of 
PRC control in the area.39 New unilateral administrative practices over a disputed area not only 
create micro-faits accompli, they can also have long-term consequences beyond any discernable 
                                                        
38 See Appendix. 
39 Garver, “China’s push,” pp. 1006, 1008.  
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change in the status quo. Building a new road in a disputed territory, or expanding an occupied 
island or reef, can support increased administrative presence and resource exploitation in 
surrounding areas. Scientific research — especially cartography, meteorology and 
oceanography — is a precondition for future military operations, infrastructure and patrolling. 
An increase in patrolling at one point in time can facilitate further increases in following years, 
as front-line actors gain experience and confidence operating in once-unfamiliar areas. The 
Philippines-China standoff over Scarborough Shoal in 2012 provided a vivid illustration of this 
dynamic. The PRC’s rapid on-water intervention to block the Philippines Navy from arresting 
Chinese fishermen was only possible because two maritime surveillance vessels were located 
nearby on a regular patrol. Such patrols commenced in the South China Sea in 2007. Five years 
later, these demonstrative behaviors directly enabled the PRC’s seizure of Scarborough Shoal.40 
 
                                                        
40 As explained by the head of the State Oceanic Administration in a 2012 television interview. “Liu Cigui: Bohai 
yiyou haishang wuran yanzhong (Liu Cigui: Pollution Serious from Bohai Oil Spill),” Phoenix TV, June 11, 2012, 
available at https://phtv.ifeng.com/program/wdsz/detail_2012_06/11/15202134_0.shtml 
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Figure 2: Accumulation of PRC assertive behaviors in South China Sea, 1970-2015. Four periods of rapidly 
intensifying assertiveness are highlighted.   
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The accumulating layers in Figure 2 thus illustrate how assertiveness results not only from 
contemporary policy decisions, but also from groundwork laid down in previous years. This 
has important implications for the explanation of observed shifts in behavior. Causal links 
between past and present lines of action make it necessary to consider not just the immediate 
triggers for an observed change in state behavior, but also temporally distant decisions, and 
slower-moving processes whose effects may only become observable years after being set in 
motion. As the next section will show, these quantitative events data help to rule out several 
dominant explanations for change in the PRC’s policy, but further understanding of what does 
lie behind observed changes will require focused qualitative analysis. 
The analysis above represents the first systematic attempt at measuring the long-term changes 
over time in the behavior of the PRC in the South China Sea dispute. Operationalizing the 
typology of assertive state behavior in maritime and territorial disputes with a unique time 
series of events data demonstrates several important descriptive findings. Increasing 
assertiveness is not a new feature of China’s policy in the South China Sea, and within this 
overall trend of increasing activity, four turning points have each established a new policy 
status quo on the issue. The surges in PRC assertiveness that followed the turning points in 
1973, 1987 and 1992 lasted around 3 years, but China’s fourth push through the South China 
Sea is far more sustained, having begun in 2007, several years earlier than most English-
language analysis has assumed. These findings provide an important descriptive foundation 
upon which to qualitatively investigate the causes of change in Beijing’s behavior.  
 
Explaining China’s policy shifts 
Explanations for China’s South China Sea policy broadly fall into two groups, respectively 
emphasizing external and internal factors. The former point primarily to changes in the 
strategic context in which the PRC operates. In line with realist expectations, many analysts 
argue China acts as assertively as its strategic circumstances permit. Thus, favorable changes in 
the PRC’s relative power within its region — both internally from the growth of China’s own 
military, economic and technological capabilities, or externally from the decline of those of 
others, particularly the US — have resulted in China intensifying its activities.41 As Friedberg 
argues, behind the PRC intensified assertiveness lies “increasingly favorable leadership 
assessments of the nation’s relative power and of the threats and opportunities that it 
confronts.”42  
A second popular explanation for policy change in the South China Sea has been resources, 
particularly hydrocarbons and fisheries. 43  In general, the higher the value of the disputed 
                                                        
41 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 94-95; Chi-
Kin Lo, China’s Policy Towards Territorial Disputes (London: Routledge, 1989); Jie Chen, “China’s Spratly Policy: 
With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia,” Asian Survey Vol. 34, No. 10 (1994), pp. 893-903 (901-
902). 
42 Friedberg, ‘The Sources of Chinese Conduct,” p. 143. 
43  Swaran Singh, “Continuity and Change in China’s Maritime Strategy,” Strategic Analysis Vol. 23, No. 9 (1999), 
pp. 1493-1508 (1506). 
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resources to the disputants, the greater the incentives for competition.44 Research on energy 
conflict has also associated revolutionary forms of government, oil-centric economies and 
narrow rent-seeking selectorates with resource-fueled aggression.45 International estimates of 
the South China Sea’s oil and gas reserves have been revised downward over time, but internal 
Chinese government sources dating back to the 1970s have consistently touted their potential, 
along with other mineral deposits rarely mentioned in outside analysis.46 The area’s abundant 
tropical fisheries are also heavily emphasized in PRC sources, and the severe depletion of fish 
stocks in coastal waters in the post-1978 reform era underscores the plausibility of resources 
as a driver of PRC policy there.47  
Third, following the logic of preventive war, states may make assertive moves in the present to 
avoid doing so under worse circumstances in the future. When a state’s bargaining position in 
the dispute is weak and deteriorates further, leaders may perceive the possibility of a favorable 
diplomatic resolution to be in danger of declining to zero, creating incentives for escalatory 
action to preserve the claim.48 Fravel’s exhaustive study of the PRC’s territorial disputes found 
that “China has been more willing to use force when its bargaining power has declined, not 
strengthened.” Following this logic, external developments that significantly weaken the PRC’s 
position in the dispute — such as new assertive actions by other claimants — may explain an 
increase in the state’s assertiveness.49 
Fourth, changes in the international normative context could spur new assertive behaviors. The 
UNCLOS regime has hardened disputed maritime claims on all sides, spurred the development 
of new enforcement capabilities, and created incentives for assertive actions to advance their 
legal positions.50 According to Sheila Smith, this has been the case in the East China Sea, where 
the Law of the Sea has hardened the claims of Japan and China to the oil and gas resources in 
the area.51  
Internal explanations for China’s assertive policies include domestic legitimacy issues; rising 
nationalism; elite competition; bureaucratic politics; and individual leaders. Domestic 
                                                        
44 Charles L. Glaser, “How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,” International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Fall 2013), 
pp. 112-145, (122-123); Jeff Colgan, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War,” International Security, Vol. 38, 
No. 2 (Fall 2013), pp. 146-180 (156). 
45 Jonathan N. Markowitz, “Prices or Power Politics? When and Why States Coercively Compete over Resources,” 
in Kelly Greenhill and Peter Krause ed., Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics (New York: OUP, 
2018), pp. 271-287; Jeff D. Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict,” 
International Organization, No. 64 (Fall 2010), pp. 661-694. 
46 E.g. Qu, “Nanhai haishang jubu zhanzheng,” p. 117; Liu, Liu Huaqing Huiyilu, pp. 534-535. 
47 As of 2004, according to FAO statistics, Chinese boats took 3.6 million tons of fish from the South China Sea, 
equal to 25 percent of the country’s catch. Philippine and Malaysian fisheries were worth more than US$1 billion 
in 2007. https://map.seafdec.org/fisherybulletin/statistical_bulletin/fisher_prd_mr_action.php 
48 Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 55; Fravel, “Power Shifts and Escalation,” pp. 48-50. 
49 Fravel, Strong Borders, pp. 7-9, 31; Swaine and Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior.” 
50 Isaac Kardon, China’s Law of the Sea (Yale University Press, forthcoming); Andrew Chubb, Chinese Popular 
Nationalism and PRC Policy in the South China Sea (Ph.D dissertation, University of Western Australia, 2017), 
Chapter 4. 
51 Sheila Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2015), pp. 107-110. 
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legitimacy issues may have prompted international confrontation, per diversionary conflict 
theory. Many analysts have argued further that rising nationalist sentiments among the public 
in China has created pressure for tough foreign policies in order to preserve regime 
legitimacy.52 Sub-state policy interests are argued to have lobbied successfully for assertive 
policies, with competing maritime agencies seeking to stretch their mandates, win budgetary 
allocations, and secure political prestige within the PRC bureaucracy.53 Politically, intensified 
intra-state competition could make arguments for restraint prohibitively risky for CCP elites.54 
Finally, individual leaders could make a difference: a politically weak leader may lack the 
authority to prevent assertive maritime conduct, or a more hawkish leader may drive a more 
assertive policy after taking charge.55 
 
Four breakpoints 
As James Rosenau suggested, breakpoints in a state’s behavior offer important information 
upon which to base explanations of foreign policy change. 56  Below, the four breakpoints 
identified in the events data on Beijing’s maritime behavior — 1973, 1987, 1992 and 2007 — 
are assessed in light of existing works and a range of PRC party-state sources. In addition to the 
materials used in the events data, further insights are drawn from internal speeches and 
conference papers by party and military personnel, retrospectives of PRC officials, government 
advisory reports and, in the most recent case, search engine activity data and online media 
content. The scarcity of evidence from the CCP leadership’s internal policy deliberations means 
a comprehensive process tracing of the relevant state decisions is not yet possible. Still, the four 
case studies below bring new evidence to light on long-debated events, including the move into 
the Spratly Islands in 1987 and the seizure of Mischief Reef in 1994, while providing insights 
into the broad patterns identified in the quantitative data.  
With the important exception of Garver, most analyses of China’s policies in the South China 
Sea in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s have focused on explaining Beijing’s use of force. The 
assertiveness framework developed here places the use of force within a broader context of 
                                                        
52 Robert Ross, “The Problem With the Pivot,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 6 (2012), pp. 70-82; Suisheng Zhao, 
“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 82 
(2013), pp. 535-553; Medcalf and Heinrichs, Crisis and Confidence, p. 21. 
53 Yingxian Long, “China’s Decision to Deploy HYSY-981 in the South China Sea: Bureaucratic Politics with 
Chinese Characteristics,” Asian Security Vol. 12, No. 3 (2016), pp.148-165; Wong, “More than Peripheral,” pp. 
744-752; Garver, “China’s Push,” pp. 1026-1027; Jakobson, China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors, p. 6; 
ICG, Stirring Up the South China Sea (I), pp. 18-26. 
54 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Joseph Fewsmith and 
Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in David M. 
Lampton ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 151-187; M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining stability in the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands 
dispute,” in Gerald Curtis, Ryosei Kokubun and Jisi Wang eds., Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China-
Japan-US Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2010), p. 158. 
55 You Ji, “The PLA and Diplomacy,” p. 253; Sutter and Huang, “China’s Toughness on the South China Sea.” 
56 James Rosenau, “Towards Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy,” in Charles Hermann, Charles Kegley and 
James Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Winchester: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 53-74 
(61). 
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state behavior in the disputed area, opening up new conclusions about both the timing and 
sources of the PRC’s maritime dispute policies. In particular, scholars have argued over whether 
the PRC’s the use of force in 1974 and 1988 was opportunistic or preventative, and debated the 
relative importance of energy resources and domestic politics behind the decisions. As the 
analysis below shows, these arguments are generally not mutually exclusive, but they each 
overlook deeper processes animating change in the PRC’s approach to maritime issues. Force 
has been one tool serving a broader, evolving goal of administrative control over maritime 
space that has emerged through the PRC’s engagement with the developing of the Law of the 
Sea regime.  
 
1973: pushing past the Paracels 
From late 1973 onwards, the PRC used force to evict South Vietnam from the Paracel Islands 
and stepped up its civilian presence and military infrastructure construction. Saigon was not 
the only target, however, as the PRC quickly pushed past the Paracels, launching a systematic 
program of general scientific surveys in the waters to the east and south of the archipelago. The 
PRC also dialed up criticism of the Philippines over its moves in the Spratlys, opened up a new 
China-Philippines bilateral dispute over Scarborough Shoal, and began asserting its restrictive 
position on foreign military surveillance in and beyond the territorial seas against the US and 
USSR. Existing accounts of China’s actions in this period have pointed to advantageous 
geopolitical circumstances, negative local developments in the disputed area, and a growing 
struggle over offshore energy resources, to explain the PRC’s use of force against South 
Vietnam. But as shown below, the Paracels operation was part of a more general policy shift 
rooted in the international normative environment. 
The most visible element of the surge from 1973 was the seizure of the southwestern half of 
the Paracel Islands, known as the Crescent Group. The operation, which established PRC control 
over the entire archipelago for the first time, was an early demonstration of the PRC’s use of 
irregular maritime forces as front-line implementers of new policies. It began when armed 
fishing crews — maritime militia — began staking out unoccupied islands in the Crescent Group 
from December 1973. 57 Military confrontation followed in January 1974 when Saigon sent 
reinforcements to push the PRC out of its new positions. This advance into the Crescent Group 
was clearly well planned, even though Beijing probably had not intended to immediately evict 
the nearby South Vietnamese forces.58 Drawing on eyewitness testimony, the United States 
                                                        
57 Fravel, “Power shifts,” p. 75 note 111; Fravel, Strong Borders, p. 280; Dieter Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the 
South China Sea: Paracels—Spratlys—Pratas—Macclesfield Bank (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1976), p. 
34, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000300180013-8; on 
the recent roles of China’s maritime militia, see Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime 
Militia,” in Michael McDevitt ed., Becoming a Great “Maritime Power”: A Chinese Dream (Arlington, VA: CNA 
Corporation, 2016), pp. 62-83, available at: https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/IRM-2016-U-013646.pdf 
58 Fravel, Strong Borders, pp. 281-282.  
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Army Special Research Detachment assessed that preparations were “initiated at least by 
December 1973, and possibly as early as September 1973.”59 
The advance was well timed to capitalize on the weakness of the South Vietnamese regime and 
the warming of Sino-American relations after 1972. A US intelligence memo at the time referred 
to the prospect of American support for South Vietnam in the Paracels as “virtually ruled out.”60 
China’s leaders may also have sensed a closing window of opportunity to prevent the South 
Vietnam-held islands from falling into the hands of Soviet-backed North Vietnam, which would 
be more capable of defending them than the moribund Saigon government. As Chi-kin Lo has 
shown, signs of mistrust between Beijing and Hanoi over the issue were already emerging by 
1973. 61  Fravel finds that documentary evidence to support a “window of opportunity” 
interpretation is lacking, but acknowledges that the US drawdown in Southeast Asia resulted in 
“reduced constraints on China's use of force[.]”62 At a minimum, then, these positive changes in 
the PRC’s relative power position within its region presented advantageous conditions for the 
move into the Crescent Group.  
Energy resources were quickly touted as a likely driver of the PRC’s actions.63 Preliminary 
seismic surveys conducted under United Nations auspices had identified potential 
hydrocarbons in the Spratly area in 1969, prompting the Philippines and South Vietnam to 
occupy islands and initiate hydrocarbon explorations there. 64  The assertive push also 
coincided with the spike in world oil prices after the October 1973 OPEC embargo, increasing 
the incentives for confrontation over resources. However, while the potential resource 
bounties may have contributed to the PRC’s calculations, they were probably not a central 
motivation. The PRC’s made its first official claim to resource rights around the disputed islands 
more than four years after the UN survey, and the statement did not refer to oil and gas in 
particular. 65  China was also insulated from the oil price shock, being self-sufficient in oil 
production at that time thanks to the large onshore field at Daqing.66 As shown below, if energy 
resources mattered, it was as one element of a broader emerging PRC interest in the area. 
A little-noted scientific program that immediately followed the Paracels operation casts 
significant new light on the motivations behind the PRC’s South China Sea policy at this time.67 
                                                        
59 United States Army Special Research Detachment (USASRD), Chinese Amphibious Assaults in the Paracel 
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60 Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, “Potential for Conflict Over Certain Disputed Islands in the East 
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In the first half of 1974, as illustrated in Figure 3, the PRC launched a systematic program of 
scientific surveys the across “Paracel Archipelago Sea Area” (Xisha Qundao hai qu) — a wide 
geographic area named after, but extending far beyond, the archipelago. These investigations 
were much more than a hunt for oil and gas. A government yearbook describes their breadth 
of purpose: “The unfolding of marine hydrological-meteorological, geographical-geological, 
biological, chemical and physical survey research has extreme significance for fisheries 
production, transportation, oil and gas exploitation, warship activities, overall resource 
appraisals and maritime forecasting.” Besides geological samples, they collected large volumes 
of biological specimens, gravitational, magnetic, bathymetric, and meteorological data.68 
 
Figure 3: Expanding geographic scope of PRC “Comprehensive Survey” program, 1975-1979.  
 
The scope of the comprehensive survey program soon expanded southwards from the “Paracel 
Archipelago Sea Area” to the “Central South China Sea Sea Area” (Nanhai zhongbu haiqu). The 
rapid push past the Paracels, and the spatial arrangement of these operations, with 
measurement stations evenly spaced across wide expanses of sea, illustrates clearly how the 
scope of the PRC’s interests in the South China Sea had expanded beyond claims to the disputed 
island territories, which it had inherited from its civil war rival, the Republic of China. The PRC’s 
interests in the South China Sea had undergone a crucial redefinition, beyond island territories, 
and towards broad-ranging administrative rights across large maritime spaces — including, 
but by no means limited to, the resources within. Developments in the international normative 
context of the emerging Law of the Sea explain why this new interest in the administration of 
maritime space was at the forefront of policy planning at the time. 
The match between the start of the UNCLOS III negotiations in 1973 and China’s assertive push 
past the Paracels was not coincidental. The negotiations specifically sought to codify new norms 
of state jurisdiction beyond the narrow customary territorial sea limit, and their 
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commencement prompted the PRC’s first official statements on the matter in July and August 
1973.69 As Kardon shows, the PRC’s positions on state jurisdiction at sea were at first derived 
largely from other Third World states’ statements over the preceding years, but Beijing quickly 
emerged as an influential player in the negotiations. 70  The PRC’s advocacy for a 200nm 
Exclusive Economic Zone, as against other less expansive proposals, reflected the CCP’s radical 
ideological line of the time. However, it was detrimental to the PRC’s material interests, as PRC 
delegates later lamented.71 Specifically, the 200nm EEZ norm greatly bolstered, and in some 
cases even created, the legal resource claims of China’s neighbors in the East and South China 
Seas — as illustrated starkly in the 2013-2016 arbitration case launched by the Philippines 
under the UNCLOS. The PRC has wrestled with this legacy of greatly expanded, yet materially 
unfavorable, norms of maritime jurisdiction, ever since. 
As the negotiations unfolded through 1974, the PRC’s position moved well beyond that of other 
Third World states, introducing claims for the recognition of security interests in the new 
jurisdictional zones, in addition to economic rights. Among other claims, the PRC asserted 
authority over all scientific research and military activities in the EEZ.72 The UNCLOS III process 
thus not only crystallized the party-state’s interests in offshore resources, but also wide-
ranging security interests across large expanses of ocean — a position that has been a key point 
of US-China friction in East Asia since that time. The expansive PRC positions on state 
jurisdiction at sea that emerged through the UNCLOS negotiations in the 1970s were 
formulated at the highest levels of the party-state. Former diplomat and ITLOS judge Xu 
Guangjian, who was part of the PRC’s negotiating team, has stated that a central-level leading 
group was established under State Council leadership to oversee the negotiations, coordinating 
a cross-departmental delegation that included the Foreign Ministry, State Geological Bureau, 
State Oceanic Administration, and PLA Navy.73 
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Evidence for internal drivers as a cause of the new assertiveness from 1973 is comparatively 
weak. The new maritime interests driving the assertive policy transcended narrow sub-state 
interests, with the Paracels operation reportedly overseen by Marshal Ye Jianying and Deng 
Xiaoping at the behest of Chairman Mao.74 Not only had Mao restored Deng to the Central 
Military Commission in 1973 following four years in political exile, he had also brought back Su 
Zhenhua, a proponent of naval modernization, as Political Commissar of the PLA Navy.75 Nor 
do distinct bureaucratic interests of the PLA Navy do not appear to have been an important 
factor. The policy shift also involved a diverse array of actors within the party-state: while the 
PLAN and local maritime militia implemented the Paracels operation, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences conducted the subsequent “comprehensive survey” programs south of the Paracels, 
and the assertive South China Sea propaganda campaigns against Hanoi and Manila came from 
organs largely controlled by the “Gang of Four” radicals. Finally, as noted above, the PRC’s 
positions in the UNCLOS negotiations were formulated through a cross-departmental leading 
group under State Council leadership.76  
As economic growth fluctuated and the political campaigns of the Cultural Revolution dragged 
on, the basic conditions existed for diversionary foreign policy arguably existed. Yet, whatever 
domestic insecurities CCP leaders may have felt in 1973, they surely paled in comparison to 
those they faced in 1976. The death of Premier Zhou Enlai turned into a serious political crisis 
when massive crowds commemorating Zhou turned into angry demonstrations denouncing the 
radical CCP leadership. As Teiwes and Sun have noted, this constituted “the first challenge to 
the regime from below” in the PRC’s history.77 This was followed in quick succession by the 
death of Mao, the massive Tangshan earthquake that killed more than 200,000 people, and an 
economic recession (Figure 4). Each of these events added further grave challenges to the 
party’s authority. Yet far from prompting a foreign policy confrontation, this series of domestic 
political issues coincided with a lull in China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
No new assertive behaviors are known to have been introduced in 1976. Importantly, however, 
because most of the new activities were ongoing, China’s baseline policy was now significantly 
more assertive than it had been before the surge, and its activity continued to increase through 
the latter part of the decade. Beijing still lacked any presence in the larger Spratly archipelago, 
where its Southeast Asian rivals’ assertive activities continued to increase. But Beijing now had 
full control of the Paracels and had begun laying the groundwork for exercising broad-ranging 
state administration over sea areas around and between the two archipelagos. It would take 
decades for this new aspiration to become a realistic goal, but China’s advances in the South 
China Sea at this time provided the foundation for the next surge, to the much more remote 
Spratly archipelago.78 
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Figure 4: PRC annual economic growth in percentage points, 1970-2014, with periods of intensifying 
assertiveness highlighted (World Bank). 
 
 
1987: surging to the Spratlys  
The PRC’s assertiveness in the South China Sea from 1987 repeated several features seen in the 
1973-1975 surge. Once again, the PLA Navy clashed with Vietnamese forces sent to oppose a 
well-planned PRC operation to seize unoccupied features. Like the 1974 battle, the Sino-
Vietnamese confrontation of 1988 was only the most salient result of a more general shift in 
the PRC’s policy that pre-dated the clash. Beijing’s verbal assertiveness against ASEAN 
claimants re-emerged after more than a decade; and there is evidence PRC policy planners 
intended the move against Vietnam in part to serve as a warning to Malaysia and the 
Philippines. 79  The surge to the Spratlys was accompanied by another major expansion in 
civilian “comprehensive surveys,” with intense multi-disciplinary scientific surveying now 
covering the entire “nine-dash line” area. And like in 1976, the wave of assertiveness stalled 
with the arrival of a serious domestic legitimacy crisis. 
The move into the Spratlys was based on highly favorable assessments of the regional 
geopolitical situation the time. PRC planners expressed confidence that neither superpower 
would intervene so long as Vietnam were the ostensible target. In mid-1987, for example, Han 
Yujia of the PLA General Staff Department’s (GSD) Intelligence Division told a naval research 
center that since China was already at war with Vietnam on the land border, fighting Vietnam 
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in the Spratlys, “will not have much of an effect internationally . . . we estimate that the US and 
USSR will not stand with China, nor directly oppose China . . . in military terms the probability 
of their direct involvement is low.”80 Numerous other internal documents echo this assessment, 
which proved accurate.81 
A key Vietnamese material strength was its military alliance with Soviet Union, which 
maintained a large naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. But as Sino-Soviet relations moved towards 
normalization after Gorbachev’s ascension in 1985, analysts in Beijing had observed a 
succession of signals of reduced Soviet alliance commitment to Vietnam.82 PRC sources also 
indicate a recognition of a temporary window of opportunity to move into the Spratlys with 
minimal risk of encountering strong international opposition. Participants in a January 1988 
naval conference on the issue noted that “major countries” such as Japan and the US were likely 
to become involved in developing oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, which would 
complicate future attempts to expand the PRC presence. According to a summary provided by 
the Naval Command to the General Staff Department, the majority view at the cross-
departmental conference was that the PRC should make its move before Vietnam’s 
entanglements in Cambodia were resolved.83 
China’s position in the South China Sea dispute was not rapidly worsening before its assertive 
shift in 1987. Détente between Washington and Moscow reduced the possibility of global 
superpower conflict, enabling Beijing to concentrate more attention and resources on its 
periphery, including disputed maritime territorial claims.84 On the local level, as Fravel points 
out, Southeast Asian claimants occupied around a dozen Spratly features between 1980 and 
1988, “weakening China’s bargaining position in a dispute in which it held no contested land.”85 
But Chinese military sources indicate the majority of these actions occurred in 1988, after the 
PRC made its move.86 In the two years before China’s policy shifted on the water, Vietnam and 
Malaysia occupied three previously vacant Spratly reefs, but none of these features was a land 
territory.87 The archipelago’s 15 natural islands and rocks had virtually all been occupied by 
the end of the 1970s, the most recent being Malaysia’s occupation of Swallow Reef in 1983. 
Given that even today there remain many dozens of unoccupied submerged reefs in the area, it 
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is hard to see the occupation of such marginal features as constituting a rapid decline in the 
PRC’s bargaining position. The accumulation of assertive actions by other claimants over the 
preceding decade may well have spurred the PRC’s motivations, offering moral and political 
justifications for a move into the Spratlys. But there is little reason to believe Beijing would have 
refrained from such a move had other claimants been more restrained. 
Preparations for establishing a foothold in the Spratlys are apparent from 1982, which saw the 
appointment of Liu Huaqing as PLA Navy Commander, and the conclusion of the UNCLOS 
negotiations. Once again, a key milestone in the development of the Law of the Sea closely 
preceded the PRC’s push for expanded sea control. In the first half of 1983, Beijing ordered the 
PLA Navy’s first mission to the southernmost extent of China’s claims in the South China Sea, 
sent the State Oceanic Administration to conduct new oceanographic surveys of the central 
South China Sea, and issued a new standardized list of 287 official names for the islands, rocks 
and reefs of the Spratly archipelago.88 The following year, the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS) launched the first comprehensive surveys of the southern South China Sea, gathering 
gravitational, hydrological, meteorological, and resource information necessary for 
establishing a permanent presence there.89 In 1985, the Central Military Commission adopted 
revised strategic guidance endorsing Liu’s “offshore defense” concept, which had been in 
development since the late 1970s. This crucial reorientation, turning the focus of the navy’s 
operations from coastal areas to the “near seas,” within the first island chain, was an important 
condition for the PRC’s expansion into the Spratlys from 1987.90 
A map of the routes taken by the CAS surveys between 1984 and 1986 illustrates the PRC’s 
increasingly concrete interests in the maritime spaces across the specific area enclosed by the 
nine-dash line (Figure 5). 91 By early 1987, with the top leadership actively considering an 
operation to establish a presence in the Spratlys, the State Council ordered the CAS to further 
"strengthen survey research in Spratly waters." In response, the academy organized the largest 
expedition yet, sending two ships on a 6-week voyage that had “major significance for 
correcting charts, exploiting resources and navigation.” The mission investigated candidate 
locations for occupation, and placed sovereignty markers on Jackson Atoll and Louisa Reef.92  
The comprehensive scientific survey program that preceded the move into the Spratlys was 
also indicative of a heightened interest in the aquatic resources and hydrocarbon deposits of 
the area. However, this related less to resource security or increasing resource values than to 
the transformation of the PRC’s economic model, which rapidly increased demand for energy, 
while also unleashing profit-oriented fishing enterprises, placing coastal fisheries under strain. 
A ban on fishing in the Spratlys, in effect since 1954, was lifted in 1985, after which the Ministry 
                                                        
88 SOA, “Dashiji: 1983”; Zhang, Nansha Qundao Dashiji, p.97. 
89 Zhang, Nansha Qundao Dashiji, p. 97. 
90 Xu Qi, ‘“Maritime Geostrategy and the Development of the Chinese Navy in the Early Twenty-first Century,” 
Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein transl., Naval War College Review, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 66-67. 
91 Chinese Academy of Sciences (hereafter CAS), Nansha Qundao Ji Qi Linjin Haiqu Zonghe Diaocha Yanjiu Baogao 
(Research Report on Comprehensive Survey of the Spratly Islands and Nearby Maritime Areas), (Beijing: Kexue 
Chubanshe, 1989). 
92 Zhang, Nansha Qundao Dashiji, pp. 114, 120-121. 
China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea, 1970-2015 
 27 
of Agriculture and Fisheries began organizing fishing boats to commence the “revival of 
production in the Spratlys.”93  
 
 
Figure 5: Routes of 1984-1986 Spratly Islands Comprehensive Surveys (CAS, Nansha Qundao). 
 
Domestic drivers again appear comparatively weak in explaining China’s 1987 policy shift. In 
another echo of 1974, the CCP top leadership may not have ordered the attack on Vietnamese 
forces in March 1988: the PLA Navy captain reportedly opened fire on the Vietnamese troops 
without authorization.94 However, the central authorities in Beijing did authorize the major 
assertive actions at this time that led to conflict, including the seizure of six disputed reefs. As 
recounted by PLA Navy Commander Liu in his memoirs, the large research missions, live-fire 
naval exercises, and the seizure and occupation of six reefs were all carefully discussed and 
agreed upon by the top civilian leaders in Zhongnanhai.95  
Zhao Ziyang, who took over as CCP General Secretary in 1987, was intimately involved in the 
plan to establish a foothold in the Spratlys, according to Admiral Liu. However, it is unlikely 
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another CCP leader would have acted significantly differently. Zhao’s predecessor, Hu Yaobang, 
had personally visited the Paracel Islands in December 1985, where he vowed to “not permit 
anyone to seize even one inch of our great country's land.”96 The ultimate authorization for the 
Spratly step-up came from Deng Xiaoping, who had firmly established his paramount political 
authority at the end of the 1970s.97 
Drawing on official histories of the PLAN, Garver has argued bureaucratic politics were a 
significant driver of South China Sea policy in the 1980s. Highlighting public statements by 
senior PLAN officers emphasizing the economic importance of the South China Sea’s resources, 
Garver argues the PLAN lobbied successfully to end a lull in China’s Spratly advance in the mid-
1980s by reframing its own strategic interests with reference to the state’s new interest in 
economic development.98 But as we have seen, preparatory work for a move to the Spratlys 
was ongoing throughout the decade, as evident in the CAS and the SOA both expanding their 
comprehensive survey programs, the high-level decision to restart state-sponsored fishing, and 
the State Council’s approval of a new standardized list of the names of specific PRC-claimed 
features there. Moreover, as noted earlier, the recognition of broad economic interests in the 
South China Sea had already begun to form among diverse bureaucratic actors through the 
UNCLOS negotiation process from 1973. In framing the PRC’s South China Sea interests as 
economic as well as strategic, Admiral Liu and the PLAN were probably pushing on an open 
door. 
A diversionary motivation also appears unlikely. Macroeconomic indicators were generally 
positive throughout 1987 (see Figure 4). While China’s new policy of expansion into the Spratly 
archipelago followed after turbulent student demonstrations over the winter of 1986-1987, 
this paled in comparison with the legitimacy crisis the CCP faced in 1989. Here, once again, 
rather than leading to foreign policy aggression, the student-led protests in Tiananmen Square 
and their violent suppression in June 1989 coincided with an abrupt end to the PRC’s 
assertiveness in the South China Sea. 
 
1992: filling a vacuum? 
After two quiet years in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown, China resumed its advances in 
the South China Sea in early 1992. The year began with a major inspection trip in January by 
Hainan Province officials and PLA officers, who left behind sovereignty markers on seven 
features in the northern part of the Spratlys. The next month, Beijing promulgated its Law on 
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, inscribing the claim to the disputed islands in domestic 
law for the first time, and implicitly authorizing the use of force to evict intruders.99 In May 
1992, Beijing awarded an oil concession to a little-known US energy firm, Crestone, covering 
25,000 square kilometers in the Vanguard Bank. This led to on-water standoffs when the 
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exploration operations began two years later, with PLA Navy warships blockading a 
Vietnamese oil rig in the area.  
In 1993 the CAS “comprehensive survey” voyages in the Spratlys restarted after a two-year 
hiatus, and Vietnam repeatedly protested unilateral PRC energy surveys in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
Jiang Zemin made the first visit by a CCP General Secretary to a disputed island since 1985 — 
and still the most recent — when he toured the Paracels in April 1993. There were upgrades to 
the six Spratly outposts, creating a new and much larger generation of concrete “reef forts” 
(jiaobao) to replace the spartan “huts-on-stilts” (gaojiaowu) built in 1988, as well as a large new 
concrete sovereignty marker at Scarborough Shoal. In 1994, the Philippines and Vietnam 
protested increased Chinese fishing activities in the disputed area in the wake of a major PRC 
survey of aquatic resources.100 
The surge culminated in the seizure and occupation of Mischief Reef in late 1994. This was the 
PRC’s first use of force in the eastern part of the Spratly archipelago, loosely controlled by the 
Philippines, a US treaty ally. Mischief Reef remains China’s most recent occupation of any 
disputed feature in the South China Sea. Although originally implemented by stealth, via the 
construction of a fisheries base, the move quickly led to confrontation in May 1995, when 
Chinese vessels blocked a Philippine ship attempting to bring journalists to observe the 
situation at Mischief Reef.101 Following unprecedented public statements of concern from both 
ASEAN and the US, China’s behavior once again reverted to a pattern of steady, low-profile 
advancement. Once again, however, many new lines of assertive action had been added over 
the preceding three years, leaving the PRC’s overall policy much more assertive than ever 
before. 
The series of moves from 1992 closely followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the US 
military drawdown in East Asia — developments that created a perception of a “power 
vacuum” among many regional officials. 102  This concern was so widespread that Chinese 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen explicitly stated in a 1992 meeting with ASEAN ministers: “It is 
not necessary for any country to fill up this so-called vacuum.” This continued the pattern of 
PRC surges in the South China Sea preceded by favorable changes in China’s relative power in 
its region. It also continued the hardening of the PRC’s policy at key moments in the 
development of the law of the sea regime. In particular, the February 1992 passage of the PRC’s 
Territorial Sea Law, which received strong support from the PLA Navy, in anticipation of the 
coming into effect of the UNCLOS in 1994.103  
Energy resources were more plausibly a direct contributor to the PRC’s assertive surge from 
1992 than in 1973 or 1987, though the evidence is not conclusive. In the 1980s, the PRC’s 
growing energy demands had largely been met through ramped-up domestic onshore 
production, but by 1991 production growth had flattened while consumption continued to soar 
(Figure 6). Within two years the PRC had become a net importer of oil for the first time since 
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the 1950s.104 The events data provide circumstantial support for this contention: more than 
one-third of the newly assertive Chinese actions identified between 1992 and 1994 concerned 
energy resources, compared to around 10 percent in earlier surge periods.105 Yet the energy 
thesis is undermined by the fact that the PRC’s behavior moderated from 1995 onwards, while 
its dependence on energy imports rapidly worsened. It is possible that the looming threat of 
energy insecurity contributed to the push for the resources from 1992, but in the years that 
followed the PRC found unilateral energy development bids in the South China Sea to be riskier 
than dependence on the global market. 
The occupation of Mischief Reef has been widely understood as an example of assertive policy 
driven by lower-level bureaucratic actors rather than the central party-state. However, first-
hand PRC documentary sources now largely disconfirm this explanation. After Philippine 
authorities discovered the PRC’s new outpost, China’s embassy in Manila stated the action had 
been initiated by “low-level functionaries acting without the knowledge and consent of the 
Chinese government,” and allegedly to the surprise of Politburo Standing Committee 
Members.106 But according to the recollections of Liu Guojun, a PRC Fisheries official tasked 
with organizing the operation, the decision was taken at the Ministerial level or above.107 The 
Fisheries Administration’s construction effort at Mischief Reef was assisted by a multi-agency 
civilian scientific and technical team aboard the SOA’s Xiangyanghong-14 research vessel.108 
This cross-departmental collaboration also suggests the operation was coordinated at a high 
level within the civilian system. 
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Figure 6: PRC oil production and consumption, 1980-2013 (EIA). 
 
The assertive surge from 1992 coincided with important domestic political developments in 
China, but the possible role of individual leaders remains difficult to evaluate. It was in January 
1992 that Deng Xiaoping conspicuously reasserted his political authority, primarily in relation 
to economic policy, via his “Southern Tour.” The presence of longtime PLAN Commander Liu 
Huaqing on the Politburo Standing Committee from 1992 to 1997 also could have tilted policy 
in favor of greater South China Sea assertiveness. Jiang Zemin’s most clear-cut period of 
ascendancy, from the mid-1990s, and particularly following Deng’s death in 1997, did coincide 
with the period of moderation in the South China Sea, raising the possibility that he personally 
may have favored a moderate approach there. However, confirmatory evidence is lacking.  
As in earlier decades, domestic legitimacy challenges once again showed a strong negative 
correlation with PRC assertiveness in the South China Sea. Economic growth slumped to around 
4 percent in 1990, China’s most recent year with no identifiable intensified assertive actions in 
the South China Sea (Figure 4). A rebound in GDP growth from 1991 preceded another surge in 
the South China Sea the following year, while the next downward turn, during the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, coincided with relatively low levels of new PRC assertiveness. 
This pattern could be explained by domestic security challenges drawing state resources and 
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attention away from territorial disputes, while increasing the incentive to seek external 
cooperation.109  
The CCP’s launched a wide-ranging “patriotic education” program aimed at stabilizing the 
party’s popular ideological legitimacy in the wake of the Tiananmen protests. These campaigns, 
together with the emergence of raucously jingoistic semi-commercial media sector, and more 
recently online forums enabling PRC citizens to directly share views on political issues, has 
fueled speculation that popular nationalist sentiments could push the PRC into foreign policy 
adventurism. If this was so, we should expect to find evidence of increasingly 
confrontational stances from the mid-1990s onwards when patriotic education began to take 
effect across society.110 Yet the observed pattern is the opposite. 
Likewise, if media commercialization’s fuelling of such sentiments has been important, then we 
should have seen assertiveness rising from the mid-1990s, with the emergence of this trend in 
Chinese commercial publishing.111 If the Internet enabled nationalist pressure to influence the 
leadership’s policy, assertive changes should be apparent in the early 2000s, when online 
technologies were rolled out on a mass scale.112 But here too, the observed patterns in the South 
China Sea are contrary to these expectations: China’s assertiveness slowed from 1995 onwards, 
remained relatively low, even through the economic challenges associated with the Asian 
Financial Crisis in the second half of the decade, and did not increase again until seven years 
into the 2000s. If popular nationalism did rise in the PRC through the 1990s and early 2000s, 
as widely believed, it could not have been a significant factor in China’s policy in the South China 
Sea at that time.113 
 
2007: realizing the nine-dash line 
China’s most recent policy shift in the South China Sea has comprised two key components: a 
rapid and continuous buildup of state presence, and the introduction of regular coercive 
actions, across the nine-dash line area. The first component of this change involved rapidly 
expanding patrol activity by PRC maritime law enforcement fleets, particularly between 2007 
and 2013.114 This was followed from late 2013 by the large-scale artificial island construction 
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project in the Spratly Islands, which upgraded the PRC’s “reef fort” outposts into vast new areas 
of mid-ocean land that dwarf the naturally formed islands of the archipelago.115 The seven new 
islands have since been equipped with anti-ship missiles, climate-controlled hangars for fighter 
jets, extensive radar facilities, and long runways capable of landing both bombers and large 
civilian aircraft. They have also facilitated further, and more sustained, increases in ship 
deployments. 
The second key change, the introduction of regular coercive actions, initially targeted 
Vietnamese geological survey operations, threatened foreign corporations involved in oil and 
gas projects within the nine-dash line, and coercively implemented new PRC unilateral 
resource survey operations near the Paracel Islands by ramming Vietnamese ships attempting 
to interfere with the operation. This greater willingness to use coercion at sea produced 
confrontations with the US in 2009, Indonesia in 2010 and the Philippines in 2011, culminating 
in the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012.116 The PRC’s regular use of coercive methods has 
continued across subsequent years, with 2-3 new cases observed each year. 
The growth of China’s relative military and economic power in its region was a necessary 
condition the PRC’s behavioral shift from 2007, but the timing cannot be explained in hard 
power terms alone. China’s naval superiority over its Southeast Asian rivals was well 
established by the turn of the century. Already the largest navy in East Asia, the PLAN’s 
modernization had been underway since the early-to-mid 1990s, while Southeast Asian 
defense budgets had been crimped following the 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis. 117 
Meanwhile, the diversion of US resources and attention to the Middle East from 2001, and US-
China cooperation in the Global War on Terror, further reduced the likelihood of US military 
intervention in the South China Sea. If Beijing’s new assertive regional maritime policy was 
based primarily on material power calculations, its behavior should have shifted several years 
before 2007.  
The clearest positive development for China’s material power in the region around this time 
was the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which weakened and distracted the US. But the change in 
China’s behavior in the South China Sea was not related to the GFC, the scale of which only 
became apparent through the second half of 2008. If Beijing saw the weakening of American 
power as an opportunity to make gains in the South China Sea, that assessment at most 
entrenched a change in PRC policy that was already underway.  
The roots of China’s shift trace back more than 10 years earlier, to when the PRC wrote its 
sweeping claims to state jurisdiction at sea into its domestic law for the first time. After ratifying 
the UNCLOS in 1996, authorities began drafting a suite of new legislation to enshrine China’s 
claims in domestic law. The most important was the PRC’s 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf, which formalized China’s UNCLOS-derived claims to maritime 
                                                        
115 See the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s “Island Tracker,” available at: https://amti.csis.org/island-
tracker. 
116 For in-depth case studies of these incidents, see: Green et al., Countering Coercion; Zhang, “Cautious Bully,” 
145-157; and Chubb, Chinese Nationalism and the “Gray Zone”. 
117 Bernard D. Cole, “The PLA Navy and ‘Active Defense’,” in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti eds., The 
People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 
129-138. 
China’s Assertiveness in the South China Sea, 1970-2015 
 34 
jurisdiction, while also reserving unspecified “historic rights” (lishixing quanyi) beyond those 
allowed under the Convention. The State Council assigned the SOA responsibility for “upholding 
maritime rights and interests in accordance with the law,” and in January 1999, the agency 
established China Marine Surveillance (CMS), a new “integrated central-regional 
administrative law enforcement force” tasked with patrolling the PRC’s claimed jurisdictional 
waters. 118  In March 2000, General Secretary Jiang Zemin declared building China into a 
“maritime great power” to be an “important historic task.”119  
The most directly consequential decision behind China’s 2007 policy shift was the State 
Council’s allocation of ¥1.6 billion to equip the new CMS fleet with 13 large new ocean-going 
patrol vessels in October 2000. 120  The project took several years to bear fruit, but once 
delivered, the high-endurance cutters provided PRC maritime law enforcement the capability 
to stay at sea for the prolonged periods across the vast expanses of China’s claimed waters. The 
first ship was delivered in late 2004, and six more followed in 2005. The new agency proceeded 
with caution as it still needed to master the logistics of sustaining ships at sea for up to 40 days 
in remote, disputed sea areas. In 2006, with authorization from the State Council, CMS launched 
its first regular “maritime rights defense” patrol program in disputed waters, beginning in the 
geographically smaller and politically simpler East China Sea.121 Finally, in early 2007 this was 
expanded into the South China Sea, and the new force began conducting coercive “special 
operations” there the same year. This established the key features of the PRC’s policy that have 
prevailed since: the steady buildup of state administrative presence, and its more frequent use 
in coercive operations.  
Compared to 1987 and 1992, the post-2007 shift offers more convincing evidence of declining 
local claim strength as a driving factor. Beginning in 2004, Vietnam had undertaken new energy 
development projects with numerous third-country energy companies in the productive Nam 
Con Son Basin, a part of Vietnam’s continental shelf but within the nine-dash line. This negative 
development for the PRC had been mitigated by the signing of a tripartite joint exploration 
agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam, which held out the prospect of access to the 
energy resources in the promising Reed Bank area. But by 2007 the trilateral deal was in 
trouble, with the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila opposing its implementation amid 
claims from opposition politicians that it would contravene the Philippines constitution.122  
PRC party-state sources highlight a series of other negative developments, including a rise in 
Vietnamese fishing in the Paracel Islands, and increased detentions of PRC fishers in the 
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Spratlys. 123  One internal advisory report described the consolidation of other claimants’ 
positions as a challenge to “the stability of the South China Sea situation,” recommending the 
PRC increase patrols and strengthen law enforcement in disputed areas in order to “maintain 
the dispute and highlight presence.”124 Such analysis suggests Beijing may have perceived its 
position in the South China Sea dispute to be seriously weakening by 2007, following a decade 
of relative moderation.  
 
 
Figure 7: PRC nonferrous metal imports by volume and value, 1994-2014 (China Statistical Yearbooks). 
 
There is evidence both for and against the South China Sea’s resources as a motivation. Between 
2003 and 2006, the value of China’s energy imports more than trebled, and similar increases 
are apparent in the value of some of the key nonferrous metals routinely alluded to in PRC 
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party-state materials on the South China Sea’s resources (Figure 7). 125 On the other hand, PRC 
oil imports also saw a similarly dramatic increase between 1998 and 2000, without producing 
a surge of assertiveness at sea. Two of the four cases of intensified PRC assertiveness in 2007 
related directly to the area’s oil and gas resources, while another was indirectly related. But 
both the oil price and the proportion of energy-related assertive behaviors quickly fell back in 
subsequent years, while China’s assertiveness continued to increase. Energy security issues 
were the subject of intensive discussion in Chinese expert and policy circles in the mid-2000s. 
Yet the key poles of the debate have been between acceptance of China’s dependence on global 
oil markets on one side, and mercantilist pursuit of oil at the source in third countries on the 
other, with little sign of serious advocacy for the disputed maritime periphery as a potential 
solution. 126  In the absence of materials on top-level leadership deliberations, this mixed 
evidence makes it difficult to evaluate the importance of resources as a contributing factor 
behind the observed changes in behavior. 
The CCP’s domestic circumstances around 2007 are also mixed, but several common 
explanations can be ruled out. GDP continued to grow rapidly, but so too did incidences of 
domestic unrest around this time.127 Data compiled by Weiss also show a large rise in anti-
foreign mobilizations China between 2003 and 2005, though the number of cases was falling 
by 2006. 128 Once we consider the information provided to the Chinese public on the new 
assertive actions in 2007, however, the idea that the party-state was diverting domestic 
attention towards the South China Sea issue or pandering to popular nationalism can be largely 
disconfirmed. In no case did the party-state seek to promptly advertise its assertive actions to 
the public. One seminal incident — a CMS “special operation” against Vietnamese ships in mid-
2007 — was only revealed for the first time in a state TV documentary more than six years 
later. Others have still never been discussed. 129  This shows the new patterns of behavior 
observed from 2007 were not aimed at diverting the public’s attention with foreign policy 
assertiveness.  
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Figure 8: Quarterly average Baidu Search Index value for “South China Sea” {南海}, 2006-2011. 
 
There is evidence of Chinese citizens’ attitudes towards South China Sea issue have hardened 
in recent years.130 However, internet search activity data from Baidu, China’s dominant search 
engine, suggest this occurred after the policy change, not before. Figure 8 illustrates the online 
public’s demand for information on the South China Sea began increase gradually from 2009 
onwards, finally becoming a prominent issue on the online nationalist agenda in mid-2011. Like 
the GFC from late 2008 onwards, whatever incentive for tougher policies this uptick in jingoism 
may have generated, it could at most have exacerbated or entrenched a pattern of behavior that 
was already in place. Indeed, rather than nationalistic rancor driving PRC maritime dispute 
behavior, the data are at least equally suggestive of the reverse: the new assertiveness, and the 
ensuing increase in international tensions and incidents, may have drawn nationalist attention 
towards the issue.131 
The looming 17th CCP Congress held in October 2007 opened up top leadership positions, 
potentially creating extra incentives for ambitious officials to advocate tough foreign policy 
stances. Yet, few signs of divisions at the apex of CCP politics over foreign policy were apparent, 
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especially when compared with the tumultuous 2012 transition. Analysts describe the 2007 
congress as producing a sclerotic system of rule by consensus. 132  This delicate balance 
disintegrated in the months leading up to the 18th CCP Congress in 2012, when the spectacular 
political meltdown of Politburo member Bo Xilai triggered months of indecision over his fate. 
This raises the possibility that heightened elite political competition could help explain China’s 
abnormally high assertiveness in 2012, when an unprecedented (and so far unrepeated) nine 
cases of assertive behavioral change were identified. But, as shown above, the PRC’s 
quantitatively more assertive and qualitatively more coercive approach had already been 
observable for five years by that time, so the elite turmoil of 2012 at most temporarily 
aggravated an existing trend. There is also little if any outward sign that the South China Sea 
was an issue over which internal political struggles were fought around this time. 133  
The protracted duration of China’s post-2007 assertive policy is strong evidence that it has 
been in basic accordance with the central leadership’s intentions, and not the result of 
overzealous sub-state units acting beyond their remit. However, the historical events data tell 
us little about the possible role of sub-state bureaucracies, the military, or other vested interest 
groups in shaping the central leadership’s views of its policy interests.134 Admiral Liu Huaqing’s 
legacy has strongly associated the PLA Navy with South China Sea policy advocacy, but more 
recently Hainan Province has emerged as an effective proponent of tourism and fishing in 
disputed areas.135 However, policies commonly associated with sub-state lobbying — such as 
tourist cruises and the establishment of Sansha City as an administrative unit covering the 
disputed area — only began to receive approval well after the assertive policy shift.136 The new 
assertive actions that occurred in 2007-2008, by contrast, were clearly in line with a central 
policy guideline mandating “the unity of maritime rights defense and stability maintenance,” 
that is, advancing China’s claims to the extent that it would not trigger instability.137 High-level 
programmatic documents released around this time also suggest the overall policy direction 
was a matter of broad consensus.138 
The leadership transition from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao had been formally complete for more 
than two years by the time China’s behavior shifted. Hu’s personal authority also received a 
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boost in 2007 as his signature “Scientific Outlook on Development” was written into the Party’s 
constitution. This, and Hu’s elevation of the strategic goal of building China into a “maritime  
great power” circumstantially supports the conjecture that the assertive switch in the South 
China Sea may have reflected Hu’s policy preferences, as distinct from Jiang’s — though as 
noted above, Jiang made a landmark statement elevating the goal of a “maritime great power.”  
Together with the timing of China’s assertive surge, this evidence calls into question the 
conjecture that China’s maritime assertiveness resulted from a dovish Hu’s lack of authority.  
The current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping formally took control of the party and military in 
November 2012. Xi’s heir-apparent status was confirmed with his elevation to CMC Vice 
Chairman in 2010, but this was still more than three years after the PRC’s push in the South 
China Sea began, with Xi still a provincial-level party secretary at that time. The PRC’s behavior 
since Xi took charge has shown significant continuities with the Hu-Wen era, with the most 
conspicuous assertive moves — such as the large-scale artificial island-building campaign in 
the Spratlys — attributable to the greater state capabilities available to Xi compared with his 
predecessors.139 As indicated above, central policy guidelines mandating greater assertiveness 
predated Xi’s ascent by 4-5 years; his predecessors Jiang and Hu initiated and then elevated the 
strategic directive of building a “maritime great power”; the capacity building projects that 
enabled the new patterns of behavior from 2007 were in motion by the end of the 1990s; and 
the broad goal of extending state jurisdiction across the South China Sea’s wide expanses of 
maritime space emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. This leaves little reason to believe a different 
CCP leader would have pursued a significantly less assertive policy than Xi. 
 
Conclusion 
While China’s behavior in the South China Sea has been a central influence on security in East 
Asia in recent decades, the absence of a systematic method to measure change in states’ 
maritime behavior has impeded identification of the nature, timing, and causes of change in 
PRC policy. This article began by developing an original typology to capture important 
variations in states’ behavior in maritime and territorial disputes. Operationalizing this 
conceptual framework with original data on China’s behavior in the South China Sea since 1970, 
together with focused qualitative analysis guided by the patterns revealed in the data, yielded 
several policy relevant findings.  
First, the PRC's assertiveness in the South China Sea has intensified in some form almost every 
year since 1970, and every year since 1990. True to its own rhetorical claims, Beijing’s intent 
to prosecute its claims there has been longstanding and relatively continuous over nearly five 
decades. Most new PRC behaviors have continued into subsequent years, in many cases 
establishing necessary conditions for future assertive activities. The origins of this strategic 
intent to exercise comprehensive jurisdiction over the South China Sea’s maritime spaces lie 
not in the rise of the PRC’s economic or military power. Instead, they lie in its interactions with 
— and internalization of — the emerging norm of “territorialization” of maritime space 
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associated with the negotiation and progressive implementation of the UNCLOS from the 1970s 
onwards.140 
Second, the pivotal recent change in the PRC’s behavior in the South China Sea occurred in 2007, 
between two and five years earlier than most English-language analysis has assumed. This rules 
out the GFC (2008), rising nationalist sentiments on the issue (2009 and especially 2011 
onwards), elevated CCP intra-elite contention over the 18th party conference (2011-2012), and 
the subsequent political ascendance of Xi Jinping (2012-present) as drivers of the PRC’s 
maritime policy shift. These commonly cited factors at most exacerbated or further entrenched 
a policy change that was already underway.141 
Third, and relatedly, the quantitative and qualitative evidence presented here demonstrate 
how considerable time lags can exist between major changes in state behavior and the decisions 
that set them in motion. The PRC’s steady extension of state authority across a vast disputed  
maritime geography has depended on decades of cumulative groundwork constituted by 
earlier assertive actions. Its push to realize the goal of state jurisdiction across the nine-dash 
line area since 2007 resulted from long years of specialized research and organizational work, 
including capacity building programs initiated in the late 1990s. For foreign policy analysts, this 
indicates the value of looking beyond the proximate triggers of observed changes in state 
behavior, to consider the potentially temporally distant decisions that set foreign policy 
changes in motion.  
For policymakers, these lagged effects indicate how the actions of their counterparts may have 
less to do with recent events or their own state’s behavior or goals than it might otherwise 
appear. On one hand, this justifies skepticism regarding PRC claims that its assertiveness is a 
response to external provocations, such as when Beijing deployed anti-ship cruise missiles to 
the Spratly Islands in 2018, citing increased Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by 
the US Navy. But it also suggests analysts and officials should be cautious in attributing 
assertive behaviors to other-directed motivations like undermining their deterrent credibility, 
weakening alliances or sowing dissension. What might appear — or feel — like a targeted move 
may in fact be more simply another confident move towards realizing a stated long-term goal. 
This explanation is not only simpler, it is also more consequential. 
Focused case study analysis of breakpoints in the PRC’s behavior showed how, within the 
overall trend of steadily increasing assertiveness over time, China’s surges in the South China 
Sea in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were significantly opportunistic, implying responsiveness 
to external incentives. However, the protracted advance since 2007 appears to have had much 
less to do with outside developments than the earlier surges in PRC assertiveness. Methodical 
and sustained through multiple leadership transitions, the PRC’s administrative buildup and 
use of coercion has become an entrenched policy status quo. This suggests, paradoxically, how 
path dependence may produce altered behaviors, contrary to the assumptions of standard 
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models of foreign policy change, which emphasize inertia as a stabilizing force.142 It also means 
that “deterrence” of new PRC assertive actions may actually be better understood as the more 
difficult task of compellence. 
Analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data provides strong evidence that the PRC’s 
assertive maritime surges have not, so far, resulted from diversionary ploys designed to 
alleviate legitimacy problems of the Chinese Communist Party. On the contrary, previous 
periods of acute internal strife in China have resulted in temporary moderation of the assertive 
maritime advances, as CCP leaders have focused attention and resources on consolidating their 
internal position and seeking international cooperation, especially from neighboring countries. 
Amidst the global uncertainties over the increasingly antagonistic China-US relationship, which 
the COVID-19 pandemic and trade conflicts continue to compound, and the associated prospect 
of a major economic downturn within and beyond the PRC’s borders, the data offer one small 
cause for qualified optimism regarding future stability in East Asia. 
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